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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECLARATION OF BARNEY'S 25%
OWNERSHIP IN STI CORPORATION IS A CONCLUSION OF LAW.
Contrary to Barney's assertion, the trial court's statement of Barney's percent

ownership in STI corporation is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. The Utah
Supreme Court has long ago noted that, regardless of whether a trial court classifies a
statement a finding of fact or a conclusion of law, if it states a party's legal rights the
statement is "purely a conclusion of law." Duncan v. Hemmelwright, 186 P.2d 965, 969
(Utah 1947). On the other hand, as this Court has noted, findings of fact are to "inform
the parties about the mind ["analysis"] of the court" and "provide a basis on which an
appellate court can review the judgment. Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum
Investments, 766 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah App. 1988).
In the present case, just because the trial court referenced similar language in both
its findings of fact and its conclusions of law, that fact cannot reduce a legal conclusion to
a finding of fact. See State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1994) (appellate
court refuses to regard trial court's legal conclusions as findings of fact even though so
classified in the lower court decision.)
In its Findings of Fact, the trial court first laid out its factual findings regarding
Barney's purchases of stock, a bonus check never paid to Barney, and what it considered
unfair benefits taken by Siddoway. (Findings, 1-28). In Finding no. 29, the trial court
1

reached its legal conclusion that Barney was thus entitled to 25% ownership in STI corp.
Thereafter, the trial court entered the same conclusion as its first Conclusion of Law
(Conclusions, no. 1).] The trial court's declaration of Barney's percent ownership
constituted a decisive step from underlying facts to legal inferences from those facts,
which court's recognize as conclusions of law. Sandall v. Hoskins, 137 P.2d 819, 822
(Utah, 1943). Such a conclusion was also a statement of a Barney's legal rights and thus
purely a conclusion of law. Duncan, 186 P.2d at 969. Hence, the appropriate standard of
review is one of "correctness." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 (FN3) (Utah 1991).
II.

MRS. BARNEY WAS NOT QUALIFIED BY EDUCATION, TRAINING OR
EXPERIENCE TO PROVIDE EXPERT OPINION REGARDING THE
NATURE OF THE BENEFITS RECEIVED BY SIDDOWAY.
"The critical factor in determining the competency of an expert is whether that

expert has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the issues before it."
Patey v. Lainhart, 977 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah 1999) citing Wessel v. Erickson
Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). It is clear that Mrs. Barney did not
have the requisite knowledge to be able to assist the trial court to resolve the accounting
issues presented by this case and the trial court erred in admitting and relying upon her
opinion testimony.
Although it is true that formal training or education is not a prerequisite to giving
1

The trial court also stated in Conclusion no. 6, n[t]o the extent that the
foregoing Findings of Fact or any of them constitute a Conclusion of Law, the same are
incorporated herein and by this reference made a part hereof. . ." (Conclusions, no. 6).
2

expert testimony, the proffered expert must at least be shown to have some specialized
training or experience in the relevant area beyond a layperson so that his or her opinion
can be seen as reliable and based on more than mere speculation. Utah Rules of Evidence
702.
Simply because Mrs. Barney has been employed in positions that have required
her to perform general accounting duties does not mean that she has the requisite
experience and training to review and analyze corporate/accounting records to determine
which benefits and expenditures were inappropriate. If such were the case, anyone who
had run their own business, worked as an office manager or in an administrative position
in an accounting department could have provided similar "expertise" to the issues
presented by this case. Mrs. Barney's "qualifications" simply do not satisfy the minimum
requirements of Rule 702.
Mrs. Barney is not a Certified Public Accountant. She has an associate degree in
accounting from a local junior college and has worked for several years as an office
manager and before that a customer service agent. One of her former employers obtained
a judgment against her for taking money from the company and exposing the company to
liability because of her incompetent "accounting" services.
Finally, while objectivity is not a requirement in expert witnesses, bias is ever a
point for impeachment. Mrs. Barney is the Appellant's wife, with a complete interest in
his potential damages. The fact of this bias should have called her objectivity into
3

question from the outset.
The trial court's error in qualifying Mrs. Barney as an expert is analogous to a
legal malpractice case where the plaintiff seeks to qualify as a legal expert an individual
who has a degree from an un-accredited law school, has never taken or passed the state
bar exam, has worked several years as a paralegal in a law office, but who was sued by a
former law firm for exposing the firm to liability for dishonesty and incompetency, and is
the spouse of the plaintiff. There can be no doubt that it would be an abuse of discretion
to qualify such an individual to provide expert opinion on complex legal issues and the
applicable standard of care. Nonetheless, this is tantamount to the ruling of the trial court
in this case by admitting Mrs. Barney as an expert accounting and damages witness.
The trial court abused it discretion in qualifying Mrs. Barney as an expert. This
abuse of discretion constituted prejudicial error because without Mrs. Barney's testimony
and exhibits there was no other specific evidence presented by Barney with regard to the
alleged improper compensation and benefits received by Siddoway upon which the trial
court could have relied to reach its decision.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING INTO EVIDENCE
IMPROPER SUMMARIES BY MRS. BARNEY.
As a general rule, an expert may not guess, speculate, or offer opinion testimony

which is mere conjecture. State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 231 (Utah 1980). Furthermore,
where an "expert" admits that his or her opinion is based upon speculation, it is proper to

4

strike the expert's opinion from the record. Stevenson v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347
(Utah 1996). Mrs. Barney's opinions and conclusions were shown by her own testimony
to be based on conjecture and speculation, and thus, the trial court erred in accepting her
so-called "summaries" into evidence.
As has been shown, Barney's attempt to qualify Kristi Barney as an expert witness
with expertise sufficient to testify about STI corporate accounting or damage summaries
in litigation was contrary to the facts presented to the trial court. Her incompetence as an
accounting expert witness in this matter was matched only by the complete lack of
credibility in her exhibits which, by her own testimony were selective, arbitrary and
substantially unsupported (Transcript, pp. 302, 315, 316, 328, 340-41, 342, 397).
A.

The Trial Court's Reliance Upon Kristi Barney's Summaries Was a
Prejudicial Error,

When trial evidence is not sufficient to support the verdict without wrongfully
admitted evidence, an error in admitting the evidence is prejudicial and a ruling which
follows such evidence is prejudicial. See Sokol Crytal Products, Inc. v. DSC
Communications Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 1435 (7th Cir. 1994). In making a "harmlessness"
evaluation with regard to the admission of evidence, the court must consider the centrality
of the evidence at issue and its prejudicial effect in the trial court's consideration. See
Nieves-Villanueva v. Soto-Rivera, 133 F.3d 92, 102 (1st Cir. 1997).
Moreover, although several individual evidentiary errors might not, standing alone.

5

have affected a party's substantial rights, the court may find that the collective effect of
multiple evidentiary errors in fact deprived the moving party of a fair trial. See Phoenix
Associates III v. Stone. 60 F.3d 95, 105 (2nd Cir. 1995).
In the present case, the trial transcript itself demonstrates very clearly that without
reliance upon Kristi Barney's flawed testimony and improper summaries, the trial court
would have had little or no basis for its finding that Barney was a 25% shareholder in STI
corp. During cross-examination Mrs. Barney admitted that her conclusion that Siddoway
had wrongfully received excess compensation and benefits was based on speculation.
(See Appellant's Brief, statement of facts 35-41). Siddoway objected to the speculative
nature of Mrs. Barney's testimony and summaries but was overruled each time.
(Transcript, pp. 304, 307, 321, 323-324, 352, 361-365).
The only relevant testimony offered to the trial court besides that of Siddoway and
Mr. Okuda was Barney's, which amounted to a brief and bland description of his view of
the company and his minor role in it. He offered no real testimony about improper
benefits and only limited evidence as to a compensation agreement with Siddoway.
Barney's claim that Siddoway admitted the unfair benefits (Appellee's brief, p. 22)
is untrue. Siddoway repeatedly denied that Barney was ever entitled to an equal share of
everything in the company, and while he acknowledged certain expenses, (i.e. key pad on
his garage, fishing trip) the expenditures were shown to be justified in other testimony.
(Transcript, pp. 342, 345). Thus, Kristi Barney's improper summaries were central to the
6

trial court's determination and their admission as evidence was prejudicial to Siddoway.
and not "harmless error."
B.

Barney's Insurance Benefits Argument is Betrayed by Competent
Testimony and the Trial Court's Findings.

Arguing under the incorrect assumption that Barney, who, by the most generous
count possible, purchased only a fraction of company stock, was entitled to a dollar-fordollar share of anything touched by Siddoway, Barney argues that Siddoway abused the
benefits of insurance policies through the company. (Appellee's brief, pp. 20, 21 & 24.)
This argument is fundamentally flawed, first because no credible evidence suggested that
Barney was entitled to an equal and commensurate benefit at every level of company
operation. Secondly, the trial court admitted that its review of insurance policies showed
that it was administered according to "the agreement." (Findings, no. 33).
Barney admitted to the trial court that the company paid his insurance premiums
for approximately three years (Transcript, p. 214) until he and his wife chose to take
advantage of another policy through his wife's employment instead. (Id.) He also recalled
of at least one instance when the company paid medical costs for him over and above any
insurance payment. (Transcript, p. 215). Kristi Barney's "summaries" make no mention
of such payments or benefits.
Kristi Barney testified that Barney was actually covered by a life insurance policy
for a premium of $96.50 each month and that Mr. Siddoway was covered with a premium

7

of $252.80 each month-with a net difference of $156.30. (Transcript, pp. 312-313). The
difference in value was thrown around by Barney as if Siddoway had derived an unfair
benefit. But Siddoway had already testified that higher priced policies on him served as a
less expensive insurance alternative which anticipated the higher cost of replacing his
services to the company (as apposed to Barney's services) and he clarified the fact that
the company-not his wife or him—would be paid in the event of a claim on that policy.
(Transcript, p. 140).
C.

The Trial Court's Finding of Unfair Compensation to Mrs. Siddoway
Goes Against the Only Competent Testimony on the Subject.

Both Siddoway and Mr. Okuda, the company accountant, testified as to the
valuable services rendered the company by Mrs. Siddoway (without other compensation)
(Transcript, pp 144-145, 444). Barney offered nothing on the subject. Yet the trial court
found that Siddoway had unfairly benefitted by having his wife's car paid for through the
company. This finding could only be reached by ignoring the competent evidence offered
on the subject which showed that Mrs. Siddoway ?s use of the company car was the only
compensation she received for her valuable services to the company. (Transcript, pp. 144145). As an employee, Barney also received the benefits of a company vehicle,
(Transcript, pp. 226-227) yet unlike Mrs. Siddoway, he was paid a salary for his work.
The car should not have been considered an unfair benefit by the trial court, and without
reference to Kristi Barney's improper "summaries'1, the trial court would have no basis

8

for having done so.
D.

Barney's Continued Reference to Payments for Legal Services are
Irrelevant and Misleading.

Barney attempts to make an issue of the fact that a company check paid for legal
assistance to Mr. Siddoway in a prior divorce action. (Appellee's brief, p. 20). However,
the record shows, at page 147, that the payment in question was made when Siddoway
was the sole owner of the company and before Barney ever purchased stock. Therefore,
references to any such payment are not only irrelevant but distractive to actual issues.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to note that the trial court once again overruled Mr.
Schmutz' objection on that point and allowed the testimony in. (Id.)
E.

The Trial Court's Position on Siddoway's Use of Jazz Tickets Was Not
Based Upon Competent Evidence.

The trial court found, and Barney continues to allege in his brief, impropriety in
the way Mr. Siddoway, as president of the company, made use of company Jazz tickets.
(Appellee's brief, p. 20). It should be noted, however, that without reference to and
dependence upon the improper "summaries" supplied by Kristi Barney, the only evidence
upon which the trial court could have relied with regard to Jazz tickets was Siddoway's
testimony that: 1) the company had been ticket holders for more than 15 years
(Transcript, p. 192); 2) that all employees used the tickets, including the Barneys
(Transcript, p. 148); 3) that he (Siddoway) attended perhaps as many as 50% of the home
games (Transcript, pp. 192-193); and 4) that as part of his job in business/client
9

development and advertising, the company benefitted significantly by him taking current
and potential clients to Jazz games. (Transcript, pp. 192-193).
Barney himself offered no testimony about use of Jazz tickets. However, Kristi
Barney admitted going to Jazz games (Transcript, p. 353) and she admitted that her only
basis for counting the Jazz tickets as an unfair benefit to Siddoway was the fact that
Siddoway attended the games when she and her husband attended. (Transcript, p. 354).
On the other hand, Mr. Okuda testified that company expenditures were proper
(Transcript, p. 433) and that he never thought that Mr. Barney and Mr. Siddoway were to
be compensated the same and that in fact, from his understanding of the operation and
management of the company, he assumed that Mr. Siddoway would receive more for his
extra duties in managing the company and for his majority ownership. (Transcript, p.
453).
Therefore, without reliance upon Kristi Barney's alleged "summaries" of improper
benefits to Siddoway, the trial court had no valid basis for its position that Siddoway took
improper benefits in his use of the Jazz tickets. The only proper evidence before the trial
court on that point was testimony by Siddoway and Okuda, which explained both the use
and distribution of Jazz tickets and dismantled Barney's repeated allegation of equal
entitlement to every facet of a company in which he was an extreme minority
shareholder.

10

F.

Mrs. Barney's exhibits are not summaries within the meaning of Utah
Rule of Evidence 1006.

Barney's argument at page 23 and 24 of his brief misses the point with regard to
Mrs. Barney's exhibits being improper summaries under Utah Rule of Evidence 1006.
Obviously each of Mrs. Barney's exhibits does not need to summarize every business
record relating to STI. However, common sense dictates that if Barney proffers a
summary purporting to summarize checks and invoices for expenses of STI and/or
Siddoway personally (See Barney's Trial Exhibit 14), all of the checks contained in STI's
financial records should be included in the summary. Mrs. Barney did not review all of
the checks contained in STI's financial records and only included in Exhibit 14 those
items that she believed were personal expenses of Siddoway. (Transcript, pp. 302, 328).
The fact that Siddoway had possession of the underlying documentation or that
information missing from Mrs. Barney's exhibits was contained in exhibits presented by
Siddoway does nothing to cure the deficiencies in Mrs. Barney's exhibits as suggested by
Barney at pages 23-25 of his brief. Mrs. Barney's summaries were clearly improper
under Rule 1006 and it was error for the trial court to admit them into evidence.
G.

The Trial Court erred in admitting Mrs. Barney's summaries as they
violate the hearsay rule.

For Kristi Barney's summaries to be admissible, they must qualify both as an
exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(6), Utah Rules of Evidence, governing the
admission of business entries, and as a proper summary under Utah Rule of Evidence
11

1006. Shurtleffv. Jay Tuft & Co., 622 P.2d 1168, 1174; Trolley Square Assoc, v. Nielson,
886 P.2d 61, 68 (Utah App. 1994).
Barnev claims that Mrs. Barnev's summaries do not violate the hearsay rule
<*

*

ml

because they summarized documents prepared by Siddoway and kept in the ordinary
course of business. (Appellee's Brief, p. 27). Barney's argument is without merit. It
makes no difference that the records being summarized by Mrs. Barney were prepared in
the ordinary course of business if the summaries were also not made in the ordinary
course of business. Id. Mrs. Barney's exhibits clearly were not prepared in the ordinary
course of business for STI as she was never an employee of STI and testified that the
exhibits were prepared shortly before trial.
Similar to the present case, in Trolley Square Associates, the appellate court
reversed the trial courts admission of exhibits which were summaries of monthly rent
payments, fees and insurance payments due the plaintiff as business records because the
summaries were not records made at or near the time of the condition being recorded-the
accrual of the indebtedness. Id.
Likewise, in this case, the trial court's admission of Mrs. Barney's exhibits must be
reversed.
Barney also argues that even if the exhibits were not admitted there was other
evidence presented upon which the trial court could have based its judgment against
Siddoway for taking excessive benefits and compensation. (Appellee's Brief, p. 27). As
12

has already been shown above, the only competent evidence available to the trial court
without Kristi Barney or her summaries does not support the trial court's finding that
Siddoway received excess benefits and compensation in breach of the agreement between
the parties. Therefore, the only evidence the trial court could have relied upon the reach
its conclusion are the testimony and exhibits of Mrs. Barney. Indeed, the only evidence
specifically mentioned as a basis fort the trial court's Findings of Fact are Mrs. Barney's
exhibits and one of Siddoway's exhibits. (See trial court's Finding of Facts 28 and 31)
Accordingly, the trial court's admission and reliance upon Mrs. Barney's exhibits was
prejudicial error.
IV,

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED SEVERAL ERRORS WITH REGARD
TO THE ADMISSION OF THE SUMMARIES PREPARED BY MRS.
BARNEY AND LIMITING DEFENDANT'S CROSS-EXAMINATION AND
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY.
Barney claims at page 28 of his Brief that the trial court properly denied

Siddoway's pre-trial motion to exclude exhibits prepared by Mrs. Barney which were
produced after the close of discovery and shortly before trial, because the accounting
records relied upon by Mrs. Siddoway to create her exhibits were always in the
possession of Siddoway and therefore he should have had an intimate knowledge of the
records.
It is true that the accounting records were in the possession of Siddoway, but this
does not mitigate the prejudice imposed on Siddoway by the trial court's admission of the

13

Exhibits. Until Mrs. Barney produced her exhibits detailing what Barney claims were
improper benefits taken from STI by Siddoway, Siddoway could not review the
underlying documentation upon which Barney relied in an effort to rebut the summaries.
Mrs. Barney had taken months reviewing records and creating her exhibits. The
summaries were produced approximately a week prior to trial and after discovery had
closed. As a result, Siddoway did not have an opportunity to cross-examine Mrs.
Siddoway prior to trial regarding her damages exhibits, nor did Siddoway have sufficient
time to review the exhibits and the underlying documentation in an effort to rebut Mrs.
Barney's conclusions.
The prejudicial effect of the trial court's ruling denying Siddoway's pre-trial
motion to exclude Mrs. Barney's exhibits was compounded by the trial court's limitation
and direction with regard to Siddoway's cross-examination of Mrs. Barney, specifically
with regard to Exhibit 14 which allegedly reflects improper benefits taken by Siddoway
and upon which the trial court relied to conclude that Barney was a 25% shareholder in
STI.
The record clearly shows that Siddoway was limited in his cross-examination of
Mrs. Barney in several ways. First, Siddoway's counsel warned the trial court that his
cross-examination of Mrs. Barney would necessarily be a laborious process because
Siddoway had not been able to depose Mrs. Barney on the improper benefits allegedly
taken by Siddoway as reflected in Mrs. Barney's exhibits because they were not produced
14

until shortly before trial. (Transcript, p. 348)
The trial court responded several times that it didn't want Siddoway to cross
examine Mrs. Barney in any great detail with regard to exhibit 14 because Siddoway
could rebut the testimony with his own or that of Mr. Okuda. (Transcript, pp. 348,
352,360 and 365).
At page 360 of the transcript, the trial court interrupted the cross-examination of
Mrs. Barney once again and after a discussion with Siddoway's counsel, stating "Don't
use this witness to try and rebut that" (the lack of foundation and supporting
documentation and the speculative nature of Mrs. Barney's conclusions in Exhibit 14)
(Transcript, p. 364). The trial court concluded the discussion by stating "You don't
demonstrate that (the lack of foundation and supporting documentation and the
speculative nature of Mrs. Barney's conclusions in Exhibit 14) through this witness....
where you do that is with your own client or with Mr. Okuda" (Tr. p. 365) Siddoway's
counsel then moved on to the next Exhibit as it was obvious the trial court would not
entertain any further cross-examination of Mrs. Barney regarding the alleged improper
benefits taken by Siddoway.
Standing alone this may not have constituted harmless error if the trial court had,
in fact, allowed Siddoway to rebut Mrs. Barney's testimony with his own testimony or
that of Mr. Okuda. However, when Siddoway attempted to have Mr. Okuda rebut the
testimony of Mrs. Barney with regard to information contained on Exhibit 14, the trial
15

court sustained Barney's objection that Mr. Okuda's testimony lacked foundation because
he had not reviewed the underlying documentation (Transcript, pp. 445-449). Despite
the trial court's earlier assurances (upon which Siddoway's counsel relied) that Siddoway
would have an opportunity to present evidence through Mr. Okuda rebutting Mrs.
Barney's testimony, the trial court thwarted Siddoway's efforts to do so.
Further, the trial court improperly sustained Barney's foundational objection to
Mr. Okuda's testimony. Barney stipulated that Mr. Okuda was qualified to provide
expert opinion with regard to the accounting practices of STL (Transcript, p. 401). As an
expert, Mr. Okuda should have been allowed to offer opinion testimony as to Mrs.
Barney's classification of the expenditures on Exhibit 14 as personal to Mr. Siddoway or
business expenses of STI even though he had not reviewed all of the underlying
documentation. An expert can give opinion testimony based on facts and testimony
presented during the trial. Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974). Siddoway
should have been allowed to take Mr. Okuda through Mrs. Barney's Exhibits and based
on the information contained therein, provided his opinion as to whether Mrs. Barney's
classification of the benefits and expenditures was proper. It was error to deny Siddoway
this opportunity.
During the discussion between Siddoway's counsel and the trial court regarding
this objection, the trial court was informed that Siddoway planned on reviewing the
individual expenses contained on Mrs. Barney's exhibits to demonstrate that they were
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business expenses and not personal benefits improperly taken by Siddoway. The trial
court informed Siddoway's counsel that it did not want to go through that process as it
had already come to a decision that Siddoway had in fact taken benefits in excess of what
was the agreement between Siddoway and Barney. (Transcript, pp. 449-450 and 456457). Based on this discussion with trial court, Siddoway's counsel informed the trial
court that he would not even attempt to rebut the individual entries on Mrs. Barney's
exhibits during Mr. Siddoway"s direct examination. (Transcript, pp. 485-486). Based on
this series of events, how can Barney argue that the trial court did not "limit or preclude
Siddoway from presenting evidence he chose?" (Appellee's brief, p. 30).
Plainly, these series of errors by the trial court amounted to prejudicial error
against Siddoway under the cumulative error doctrine. Whitehead v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920 (Utah 1990). The trial court admitted into evidence damage
exhibits from Mrs. Barney that had not been produced until approximately a week before
trial so that Siddoway did not have sufficient time to perform discovery to rebut the
information in the exhibits; and then the trial court limited Siddoway's cross-examination
of Mrs. Barney, stating that Siddoway could rebut Mrs. Barney's testimony and exhibits
with his own testimony and/or that of Mr. Okuda. When Siddoway attempted to do so the
trial court would not allow it.
Together these errors were prejudicial to Siddoway because there was no other
"evidence" presented by Barney upon which the trial court could have relied to find
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specific benefits taken by Siddoway that were in excess of the agreement between the
parties which in turn the trial court used to find that Barney was a 25% shareholder in
STI.
V.

BARNEY IS NOT ENTITLED TO PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST AS THE
DATE STI WAS DISSOLVED AND THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
COULD NOT BE ASCERTAINED WITH CERTAINTY.
In Utah, the award of pre-judgment interest in proper where the loss is fixed at a

definite time and the interest can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. Coalville
City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Utah Ct.App.1997).
If the fact finder must determine the loss by using its best judgment as to the
valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment interest is inappropriate.
Shoreline Development, Inc., 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992).
In the instant case, the Court was correct in denying Barney's request for prejudgment interest because a definite time for the dissolution of STI was not established
and the damages awarded Barney were determined subjectively by the Court rather than
be a fixed standard of valuation. The trial court did not use a fixed standard of valuation
to arrive at its conclusion that Barney was a 25% shareholder in STI. In the trial court's
Finding of Fact Nos. 15, 16 and 17 it is concluded that up to December 31, 1994, Barney
had paid $14,500.00 to obtain a 14.5% ownership in STI; that the remaining balance
owed Barney when STI was dissolved was $5,130.00 which the trial court applied toward
a stock purchase bringing Barney's total ownership interest in STI to 19.87%.
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Then without any "fixed standard of valuation" or any indication as to specifically
how the amount was determined, the trial court states that "Barney's share of the excess
benefits taken by Siddoway far exceeds the $5,130.00 and therefore Barney has paid well
in excess of $25,000.00 for his 25% interest in the corporation, STI, and is therefore a
25% shareholder in STL" (Trial court's Finding of Fact No. 19). The trial court seems to
have made an equitable decision that although it could not determine the specific numbers
it found that Siddoway took some excess benefits to which Barney was entitled and
therefore this amount would make up the difference for Barney's claimed 25% interest in
STI. The trial court's finding that Barney was a 25% shareholder in STI served as the
foundation upon which the damages against Siddoway were calculated.
Because it is clear that the trial court "determined this loss by using its best
judgment as to the valuation rather than fixed standards of valuation, prejudgment
interest is inappropriate." Id.
Further, the trial court was correct in denying Barney's request for pre-judgment
interest because a definite time for the dissolution of STI was not established. In its
Finding of Fact No. 20, the trial court simply states that STI was "effectively dissolved as
of the end of February 1996 when the parties no longer worked together." The testimony
of the parties regarding when STI was actually dissolved is even more ambiguous.
Siddoway testified that sometime in February 1996 he and Barney had an argument at the
STI office during which Siddoway told Barney that he did not work for STI any longer.
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(Transcript, pp. 107-108)
Barney testified however, that he continued to work for STI for a couple more
weeks after this argument took place. (Transcript. 218-222). There was never a written
dissolution agreement between the parties with a date certain nor can a date certain for the
dissolution of STI be inferred from the evidence presented at trial
In a case similar to the instant one involving the dissolution of a partnership, the
Utah Supreme Court found that an award of prejudgment interest was improper because
the plaintiff had not presented evidence of "specific date" when the partnership was
dissolved. Cheves v. Williams, WL 701230 at p. 11, (Utah 1999). Since a specific date
cannot be established in the this case for the dissolution of STI, Barney's request for
prejudgment must be denied.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY CHOOSING
NOT TO AWARD BARNEY DAMAGES FOR SALARY ALLEGEDLY
TAKEN IN EXCESS BY SIDDOWAY
Appellate courts review the trial court's decision to award damages under a

standard which gives the trial court considerable discretion, and will not disturb its ruling
absent an abuse of discretion. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1041 (Utah
1995). Furthermore, because the adequacy of a damage award is a factual question, the
appellate court will not reverse the trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); In Re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah 1996).
In the instant case, Barney has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion
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in deciding not to award Barney damages for excess salary allegedly taken by Siddoway.
Exhibit 17, which Barney primarily relies upon as evidence of Siddoway's excess salary,
was shown to be wholly unreliable through cross examination of Mrs. Barney who
prepared Exhibit 17 and through whom Exhibit 17 was proffered. Accordingly, even if
the trial court improperly relied upon Kristi Barney and her summaries for other findings,
it is certainly not an abuse of discretion that the trial court refused to award Barney
damages for Siddoway's alleged excess salary based on this evidence.
During cross examination of Mrs. Barney it was revealed that she did not even
know whether the yearly totals for Siddoway reflected on Exhibit 17 constituted salary or
bonus (Transcript, pp. 378-379) nor did she know during which month in 1989 Barney
began receiving a salary from STI (Transcript, pp. 380-381).
Further, Barney testified that in 1993, when he discovered that Siddoway was
receiving a higher monthly salary than him, the two of them reached an agreement that
Barney would receive a raise and Barney was satisfied with the arrangement after that.
(Transcript, pp. 241-242).
Finally, although Siddoway testified that on occasion he received $200.00 to
$300.00 more in monthly salary than Barney, he also testified that this was not contrary to
their agreement and that Barney was aware of the salary that each of them was receiving.
He also testified without contradiction that there were times when he was not paid but
that Barney was-and that Barney never went without a paycheck. (Transcript, p. 168-169).
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Siddoway. testified that the original agreement was that Siddoway and Barney would
receive the same salary for the tile setting work they performed for STI. However, on
occasion, Siddoway would receive extra salary for other duties that he performed for STI
such as estimating and bookkeeping. (Transcript, pp. 33-34). Siddoway testified that
Barney was aware of this arrangement and that they would both receive raises at different
times based on the profitability of STI during a given time period. (Transcript, pp. 3541).
Based on any or all of the following testimony and evidence, the trial court could
have reasonably concluded that Barney had not carried his burden of proving that
Siddoway had received excess salary from STI contrary to the parties' agreement.
Accordingly, the trial court's decision not to award damages to Barney for the alleged
excess salary taken by Siddoway was not an abuse of discretion and Barney's CrossAppeal must be denied.
VII.

BARNEY IS RAISING FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THE
ARGUMENT THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE
ALLEGED EXCESS SALARY TAKEN BY SIDDOWAY FROM STL
Barney admits in his Cross Appeal that, at trial, he argued that he should have

received 25% of the excess salary received by Siddoway. Now, on appeal, Barney
attempts to change his argument, claiming for the first time, that "in reality," he should
have received the full amount of the alleged excess salary received by Siddoway plus
interest in the amount of $42,025.00. (Cross Appeal, pp. 34).
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Because Barney failed to present this argument to the trial court, he is precluded
from raising this issue on appeal. Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp.,
850 P.2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993): State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660-61 (Utah 1985). As a
result, Barney's Cross Appeal must fail.
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court erroneously concluded that Mr. Barney is entitled to 25% of the
ownership of STI, and further erred in applying that percentage to the assets of the
corporation in awarding Mr. Barney a judgment in the amount of $41,036.17. The
judgment also erroneously includes 50% of a note receivable from Mr. Siddoway, which
should correctly have been treated as an asset of the corporation. The court should have
distributed 14.5% of the same to Mr. Barney.
For the reasons set forth above, this court should reform the judgment to award a
14.5% ownership interest in the assets of STI to Mr. Barney and award him judgment in
the amount of $25,584.66. In the alternative, this Court should reverse the trial court's
judgment and remand this matter for recalculation of damages based upon a 14.5%
ownership of STI by Mr. Barney.
Further, the Court should deny Barney's Cross Appeal seeking prejudgment
interest and additional damages. Barney is not entitled to pre-judgment interest because
the date STI was dissolved and the amount of damages could not be ascertained with
certainty. Furthermore, despite its multiple errors, the trial court did not abuse its
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discretion by choosing not to award Barney additional salary damages related to alleged
unfair salary payments to Siddoway. Furthermore, Barney raises his salary argument for
the first time on appeal and is therefore not entitled to relief
HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

Evan A. Sc
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